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The Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (FPC) set up in 2007 is one example of the recent 
international trend to create independent fiscal watchdogs. The FPC has established itself as 
an important participant in the Swedish economic policy discussion. The FPC has small 
resources and a broad remit including employment, growth, income distribution and 
monitoring of how well the government explains its policies in addition to evaluation of fiscal 
policy. The reason why it can work is that the FPC acts as a complement to other institutions. 
The interaction between fiscal policy and other policy areas as well as the possibility to 
exploit the council’s expertise in several areas are arguments in favour of the broad mandate, 
but at the same time there could be a risk that interest is diverted away from fiscal issues. The 
FPC’s experiences illustrate the time inconsistency issues involved in establishing a fiscal 
council: a government has an incentive to create such a body as a signal that it will pursue 
responsible and rational policies, but it also has an incentive to constrain the council’s 
activities once government policies are criticised. 
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Institutions with fiscal watchdog tasks have existed for a long time in some countries: 
Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and the US are prominent examples. Recently, such 
institutions have been established in several other countries as well.
1
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 gives the background. Section 3 
describes  the Council’s  structure  and remit.  Section  4  gives an  account of its work. 
Section 5 discusses how a number of issues of principles have been handled and what the 
Swedish experiences can teach us in these respects. Section 6 concludes. 
 One of the first 
cases in this “second wave” was the Fiscal Policy Council (FPC) in Sweden, which was 
created in 2007. It appears to have served as a source of inspiration for similar bodies 
established elsewhere, including in Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia and the UK. This chapter 




2.1 The fiscal framework in Sweden 
In the early 1990’s, the Swedish economy suffered a deep crisis, with great similarities to 
the recent crises in Ireland and Spain.  GDP fell  for three consecutive years  and 
unemployment rose dramatically. As can be seen from Figure 1, the crisis had serious 
repercussions for public finances with a peak budget deficit of 11.2 per cent of GDP in 
1993. Figure 2 shows how consolidated government gross debt rose from 41.2 per cent of 
GDP in 1990 to 73.3 per cent in 1996. In 1994-95 there were interest rate differentials for 
ten-year government bonds to Germany of 3-4 percentage points (see Figure 3).  
                                                 
1 Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011) survey both earlier existing and recently established fiscal watchdogs. 
See also Calmfors (2010) and Hagemann (2010).              2 
     
 
 
        Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 89. 
 
 
Note:  Consolidated government gross debt (Maastricht debt) is defined as the general 
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Source: Reuters EcoWin. 
 
 
The  fiscal  crisis triggered an ambitious budget consolidation programme.  It  built on 
clearly defined budget targets setting out an unconditional  plan for reductions of the 
deficits that was to be reached independently of cyclical developments. The plan was 
carried out successfully.
2
  The crisis also led to the adoption of a new fiscal framework to prevent fiscal 
crises  from arising in the future. The framework is still in place. It  has  five  central 
pillars:
 In 2000, the budget deficit had been turned into a surplus of 3.6 
per cent of GDP. 
3
•  A top-down approach for the central government budget. The Parliament first 
decides  overall expenditures as well as their allocation among different 
expenditure areas. Once this is done, it is not possible to increase a particular 
expenditure without cutting down other expenditures within the same area.  
 
•  A surplus target for general government net lending of one per cent of GDP 
over a business cycle. 
                                                 
2 See Henriksson (2007) for an account of the budget consolidation process.  
3 More detailed descriptions of the fiscal framework are given in, for example, Fiscal Policy Council (2010, 
2011) and Spring Fiscal Policy Bill (2010, 2011).             4 
     
 
•  A ceiling for central government expenditures, which is determined three years 
in advance. 
•  A balanced budget requirement for local governments. 
•  A  reformed  pension system  with  defined contributions and an automatic 
balancing mechanism that is to guarantee the system’s long-run sustainability. 
 
The rules put in place have largely been followed. As a result, average government net 
lending in 2000-2010 amounted to 0.8 per cent of GDP despite the unusually deep recent 
downturn. The surpluses in 2007 and 2008 were as large as 3.6 and 2.2 per cent of GDP, 
respectively. The deficit at the trough of the recession in 2009 was as small as 0.9 per 
cent of GDP and in 2010-2011 net lending was close to zero. The most problematic rule 
has been the expenditure ceiling. Although it has never been formally violated, it has 
been  circumvented  (although only marginally)  several times through the use of tax 




2.2 The establishment of the FPC 
Changes in fiscal policy institutions may occur as a response to either acute problems or 
to theoretical considerations regarding future potential problems. In the Swedish case, the 
latter type of response explains the establishment of the FPC. 
  The idea of a fiscal watchdog in Sweden was first raised in connection with the 
debate on whether or not to join the euro. This issue was - at least for the foreseeable 
future – settled in a referendum in 2003, which decided against the euro. Before the 
referendum, a Government Commission analysed how the requirements on fiscal policy 
would change in the event of Swedish euro membership. The background was the insight 
that country-specific macroeconomic shocks would have to be handled through fiscal 
policy once the country had relinquished its own monetary policy. The Commission 
worried that fiscal policy would be too lax in booms, leaving no room for stimulus in 
downturns. To counter that risk,  the  establishment  of an independent fiscal  council, 
which would give the government authoritative policy recommendations, was proposed.
5
                                                 
4 See the Spring Fiscal Policy Bill (2007) and Fiscal Policy Council (2009, 2011). 
 
5 Swedish Government Commission on Stabilisation Policy in EMU (2002).             5 
     
 
  The idea of a council did not come down well with the Social  Democratic 
government at the time, which explicitly opposed this proposal as well as similar other 
proposals.
6 However, the idea was received more positively by the liberal-conservative 
opposition. In 2003, the then chief economist of the Moderates (the Swedish Tory Party), 
Anders Borg, wrote an article where he came out in favour of an advisory fiscal council.
7
  In 2006,  a  liberal-conservative  government took office,  with Anders Borg as 
Minister for Finance. He pushed the idea and in the spring 2007 the establishment of the 
Fiscal Policy Council was decided. There was, however, political disagreement. All the 
opposition parties – the Social Democrats, the Left and the Greens – voted against the 
creation of the Council. The Left did that with the motivation that “there is reason to 
assume that the Fiscal Policy Council will be another body providing false scientific 
clothing for the Government’s right-wing policy”.
 
8
  Empirical studies of fiscal rules and fiscal transparency usually find that both 




  A well-known problem is, however, the 
difficulty of establishing whether these factors cause the budget outcomes or whether 
both they and the budget outcomes are caused  by the same third factor(s). These 
considerations are highly relevant for Sweden.  Both  the  recent  favourable fiscal 
performance and  the establishment of the Council can be seen as consequences of a 
strong striving to safeguard public finances, which in turn is explained by the experiences 
of fiscal crisis in the early 1990’s. This does not, of course, imply that the Council may 
not  have an additional effect on fiscal policy over and above that of the political 
consensus on budget discipline. 
3 The Council’s structure and remit
10
The FPC is formally an agency under the Government, which appoints the six members. 
Ordinary members can be appointed for a maximum period of three consecutive years. 
 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Calmfors (1999, 2001, 2002, 2005). 
7 Borg (2003). 
8 Motion 2006/07:Fi7. 
9 See, for example, Alt and Lassen (2006), Fabrizio and Mody (2006), European Commission (2006), IMF 
(2009) and Lassen (2010). 
10  This section describes the Council’s statutes. They can be found in Förordning  (2011:446), which 
replaced the earlier Förordning (2007:760).             6 
     
 
The Chair can be appointed for at most two consecutive three-year periods. The Council 
is to consist of both members “with high scientific competence in economics” and 
members “with practical experience of economic-policy work”. In November 2011, the 
Council is made up of five academic economists (but of whom the Chair, Professor Lars 
Jonung,  also has practical experience from  the  Prime Minister’s Office in the early 
1990’s and later from the European Commission) and one former civil servant (with 
work experience as Budget Director in the Ministry of Finance and later as one of three 
heads of the National Audit Office). The members need not be Swedes: currently there is 
one Norwegian member.
11
  The FPC has a broad remit. According to the statutes in force from 1 July 2011, it 
is “to monitor and evaluate the fullfillment of objectives by the fiscal policy and the 
economic policy which the Government proposes and the Parliament decides and in this 
way contribute to more transparency regarding the aims and effectiveness of economic 
policy”. On the basis of the Spring Fiscal Policy Bill and the Budget Bill, the Council is 
in particular to evaluate if fiscal policy is consistent with (1) public finances that are 
sustainable in the long run; and (2) the budget targets, especially the surplus target and 
the expenditure ceiling.  
 The members perform their duties as supplementary activities 
to their ordinary work. There is a small secretariat consisting of five persons. 
The  Council is also  (1) to evaluate how the fiscal stance relates to the cyclical 
situation; (2) to evaluate if fiscal policy is in line  with healthy, sustainable long-run 
growth and leads to high employment which is sustainable in the long run; (3) to monitor 
the transparency of the Spring Fiscal Policy Bill and the Budget Bill, in particular with 
respect to the grounds given for economic policy as well as the motives for policy 
proposals; and (4) to analyse fiscal policy’s effects on the distribution of welfare in the 
short run and the long run. In addition, “the Council may monitor and evaluate the quality 
of the Government’s forecasts and the models on which the forecasts are based”. 
The cited formulations make it clear that the Council’s remit goes far beyond fiscal 
sustainability and  budget  discipline.  It also includes the role of fiscal policy as a 
stabilisation tool as well as employment and growth policies. An important part of the 
                                                 
11 In 2007-2011 there were eight members, of whom six were academics and two were ex-politicians (one 
former Social Democratic Minister for Finance and one former Vice Chair of the Moderates). One member 
was Danish and another one Finnish.             7 
     
 
remit is to contribute to a high level of economic policy discussion by monitoring that 
policies are explained and motivated in a proper way and that they are based on sound 
analytical foundations. This is emphasised by the formulation in the statutes that the 
Council “should work to achieve an increased public discussion in society of economic 
policy”. 
The statutes are vague on whether evaluations should only be ex post or whether they 
can also be  ex ante. This has been left to the Council to decide. It has made the 
interpretation that evaluations should be both ex post and ex ante. Hence, in addition to 
evaluating past policies  the  Council  comments on new  government proposals and 
sometimes makes alternative suggestions. 
The only formal requirement is that the Council should produce an annual report in 
May each year, about one month after the Government has presented its Spring Fiscal 
Policy Bill (which judges the economic situation and gives guidelines for future policy). 
The report is formally addressed to the Government. The  Council has no  formal 
relationship to the Parliament. Its Finance Committee, which prepares the Parliament’s 
decisions on fiscal policy, however, organises regularly a public hearing on the basis of 
the report with participation of the Council’s Chair, the Minister for Finance and outside 
experts. 
 
4 The Council’s work 
So far (in November 2011) the FPC has produced four annual reports. In addition, 26 
background reports commissioned from either outside academics (both Swedish and 
foreign) or written by the Council’s own members have been published. Several shorter 
opinions on various Government proposals have also been written. 
 
4.1 Themes in the reports 
On the whole, the Council’s evaluations of the Government’s fiscal policy have been 
very favourable. It has been judged to be sustainable in the long run and consistent with 
the budget targets.  There have been mainly two  points of disagreement with the 
Government: the first concerns potential problems deriving from ambiguities in the fiscal 
framework, the second the room for fiscal stimulus in the 2009-2010 downturn.             8 
     
 
 
Ambiguities in the fiscal framework 
When the  surplus  target  of one per cent of GDP  was decided in 1997, no clear 
justification was given for the level chosen. Later Government Bills have made it clear 
that the target should be seen as an intermediate one which should help achieving more 
fundamental objectives: fair intergenerational distribution, social efficiency  (tax 
smoothing),  and  the build-up of  a precautionary buffer  to be used in the event of 
unanticipated macroeconomic shocks. However, the Government has not specified the 
relative weights of the different underlying motives, which should be necessary to decide 
the appropriate level of the target. The Council has urged the Government to provide 
better underpinnings for the chosen level  and to link  it  better to long-run  fiscal 
sustainability calculations. 
A related issue concerns the interpretation of the formulation “a surplus of one per 
cent of GDP over a business cycle”. The Government uses five different indicators of its 
net lending to judge whether this is achieved: a backward-looking ten-year average, a 
forward-looking  seven-year  moving average  centred  on the current year,  current 
structural net lending, a backward-looking ten-year average of cyclically adjusted net 
lending (which is defined differently from structural net lending), and a forward-looking 
seven-year moving average of cyclically adjusted net lending. According to the Council, 
the many indicators could create confusion since they may show very different results. 
More fundamentally, the surplus target has different implications for policy depending on 
whether it is interpreted in a backward-looking way “with memory” (thus requiring that 
one makes up for past deviations from the target) or in a forward-looking way “without 
memory” (requiring no compensation for deviations).
12
 
 The Council has argued in favour 
of fewer indicators and a clear stand on how the target should be interpreted. 
The fiscal stance  
In 2010 before the parliamentary elections, the FPC warned both the Government and the 
opposition that the fiscal room for tax cuts and expenditure increases was very small. In 
its 2011 report, the Council highlighted the conflicts between the surplus target, the level 
                                                 
12 See in particular Fiscal Policy Council (2009, 2010).             9 
     
 
of the expenditure ceiling and the Government’s plans for tax cuts: in the Council’s view 
the expenditure increases allowed by the ceiling and the planned tax cuts threatened the 
achievement of the surplus target. Therefore, the Council urged the Government either to 
lower the expenditure ceiling or to abstain from the planned tax cuts. 
The greatest  policy  disagreement between the  Council and the Government  has 
concerned the fiscal stance  in the 2009-2010  recession.
13
 
  Notably,  the  Council 
recommended more stimulus than the Government thought appropriate. In the Council’s 
view, the Government overestimated both the risks of adverse financial-market reactions 
to a more expansionary fiscal stance (given the strong public finances in Sweden) and the 
strength of the automatic stabilisers. 
Employment and growth 
The current government has tried to raise employment through sweeping labour market 
reforms. They have entailed cuts in unemployment benefits and the introduction of an 
earned income tax credit. The reforms have been politically very controversial, with the 
opposition parties arguing strongly against them and questioning their effectiveness. 
Here, the Council has evaluated the research basis for the reforms. The conclusions 
have been that the reforms are likely to have substantial positive employment effects in 
the long term.  At the same time, the  Council has criticised the Government for not 
explaining that the reforms will promote job creation largely by inducing wage restraint. 
The Council has also been critical of how the tax system has developed. In 1990/91 
there was a comprehensive tax reform, broadening tax bases and imposing principles of 
uniformity and neutrality. But these principles have gradually been abandoned through 
the introduction of a number of exceptions: different VAT rates for different types of 
consumption, selective cuts of employer contributions for young people, abolishment of 
the property tax, RMI tax deductions etc. The Council has analysed which changes can be 
motivated by either optimal taxation arguments or income distribution concerns and 
which are hard to find such arguments for. 
 
Economic reporting 
                                                 
13 Fiscal Policy Council (2009, 2011). See also Section 5.1 below.             10 
     
 
The Council has had critical views on parts of the Government’s economic reporting. 
These criticisms have concerned the lack of reporting of the public sector’s total net 
worth (in contrast to the careful reporting of financial  net worth), very rudimentary 
reporting of government investment and of the development of the government  real 
capital stock, and insufficient reporting of the size and contents of various labour market 
programmes. 
 
4.2 The Council’s impact 
It is not obvious how to evaluate the Council’s impact. One should distinguish between, 
on one hand, the direct short-term impact on the Government’s actions and, on the other 
hand, the indirect  long-term impact through influence on general thinking about 
economic policy. The former impact is more tangible, but the latter may in the end prove 
more important. Three “metrics” are used here: (1) media coverage (which is related 
mainly to the long-term impact); (2) reactions  from the political system  (which is 
somewhere in between long-term and short-term impact); and (3) the extent of policy 
changes directly related to the Council’s analyses (as a measure of short-run impact). 
 
Media coverage 
The main media coverage occurs in connection with the publication of the annual reports, 
which are presented at press conferences. They have been covered by the main TV and 
radio channels. The presentation of the report has also received broad coverage in news 
articles and editorials in both national and local newspapers. The public hearings in the 
Parliament’s Finance Committee on the report have been broadcast live in one of the state 
TV channels.  
More importantly, there has been a  steady stream  over the year  of articles, 
editorials and op-eds in the press that use the FPC’s report as a point of reference. This 
impression of a “lasting influence” is supported by the pattern of downloads of the report 
from the Council’s website, which shows a continuous interest in addition to the spikes 
when the annual report is published.  
  There  has been a large number of interviews  in various media  of the FPC’s 
members (and in particular of the Chair) spread over the year on various issues of fiscal             11 
     
 
and employment policy. Council members are to a large extent turned to when journalists 
want independent comments on both domestic and foreign (especially EU) 
macroeconomic issues. The views of Council members have on these occasions often 
been contrasted with the views of the Minister for Finance and the Government. 
 
Reactions from the political system 
Both the Minister for Finance and the economic spokespersons of the political parties 
have issued statements on the report when it is published. When the Parliament’s Finance 
Committee evaluates the Government’s Spring Fiscal Policy Bill, the Council’s views are 
extensively reported and commented upon. 
  In the Government’s Budget Bill, presented to the Parliament in the autumn, one 
section summarises the FPC’s report and takes a stand on its recommendations. There 
have  also  been frequent references to the  Council’s  analyses  in both the opposition 
parties’ economic proposals and  in the comments by MPs from  the various political 
parties in the parliamentary debates. 
 
Impact on Government policy and analysis 
It  is difficult  to evaluate the Council’s impact on actual policy, since this presumes 
knowledge about the counterfactual. It is not possible to conclude to what extent 
Government proposals have been affected ex ante by a possible desire to avoid potential 
ex post criticism from the Council. One cannot, of course, expect the Government to back 
from proposals already made to the Parliament, as this would usually imply a large loss 
of political prestige. 
  One  case  where the Council  had an influence  concerns the amount of fiscal 
stimulus in 2009-10. Here, the Government in the end followed the recommendation by 
the FPC (and by others such as the National Institute for Economic Research) to give 
temporary extra grants to local governments.
14
                                                 
14 Fiscal Policy Council (2009). See also Section 4.1. 
 The Council’s call to all the political 
parties before the 2010 parliamentary elections to avoid committing to measures that 
would permanently worsen the budget balance is also likely to have had an influence. 
The warnings in the 2011 report that the Government’s planned tax cuts implied risks for             12 
     
 
budget discipline may have contributed to the shelving of these plans (although the 
worsening economic outlook and a likely defeat in the vote in the Parliament were more 
important reasons). 
  The FPC  has definitely had an impact  on  the  Government’s  thinking  on  the 
surplus target. Here, a thorough review made by the Ministry of Finance was heavily 
influenced by the Council’s analyses.
15 The review made a serious attempt to derive an 
appropriate numerical level for the surplus target from various underlying motives and to 
deal with the ambiguities in the follow-up of the target that arise from the large number 
of indicators used.
16
At a more technical level, the Council has come up with a number of suggestions 
on how the Government’s fiscal sustainability calculations and their presentation can be 
improved. These suggestions have largely been followed. After the FPC’s critique, the 
Government has improved its reporting of total public sector net worth and public sector 
capital stock, although only to a limited extent. The Government has repeatedly promised 
to improve its reporting of government investment, but has so far not delivered on this. 
 A key conclusion drawn by the Government – and in line with the 
FPC’s recommendation –  is that  future demographic strains on public finances from 
longer life expectancy  should be met by increases in the retirement age rather than 
through pre-funding (that is by saving in advance through fiscal surpluses). The argument 
is that it is not reasonable that current generations fund costs associated with the welfare 
gains for future generations following from increased longevity. 
  A key area where the Council was not able to influence policy concerns creative 
accounting with respect to the expenditure ceiling. The extra central government grants to 
local governments for 2010 were paid out in December 2009 to reduce the risk that the 
expenditure ceiling would be breached in 2010 (in 2009 there was no risk this would 
happen). Here, the Government just swept aside the Council’s critique. 
 
5 Lessons from Sweden 
The Swedish example illustrates several issues of general interest for the structure and 
work of fiscal councils. The following issues will be discussed: 
                                                 
15 Finansdepartementet (2010). 
16 See Section 4.1 above.             13 
     
 
1.  The breadth of the remit.  
2.  The amount of resources and the tasks performed. 
3.  The Council in the general political debate. 
4.  The Council’s independence. 
5.  The political fragility of the Council. 
 
5.1 How broad should the remit be? 
The FPC’s remit is much broader than according to most proposals on such councils.
17 
As discussed in Section 3.2, the remit does not only encompass evaluation of fiscal policy 
but also analysis of employment, growth and income distribution. This is in contrast to, 
for example, the High Council of Finance in Belgium and the Office for Budget 
Responsibility in the UK, the remits of which are confined to fiscal policy. But the broad 
tasks  of the FPC  are similar to those of some  other watchdogs, such as the Central 
Planning Bureau in the Netherlands and the Economic Council in Denmark.
18
   There are both pros and cons with the FPC’s broad remit. An argument in favour 
is the strong interaction between, on one hand, sustainable public finances and, on the 
other hand, high employment and growth. It also makes sense to use the expertise of a 
fiscal council  in several policy areas. The drawback is, of course, that resources are 
spread more thinly. 
 The broad 
remit in Sweden may be explained by the fact that raising employment was considered 
the primary  economic-policy objective of the liberal-conservative government that 
established the Council.  
  According to Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011) 55 per cent of the quantitative 
contents of the FPC’s reports in 2008-2010 was devoted to fiscal policy and 41 per cent 
to employment and growth (the remaining 4 per cent dealt with the Government's 
forecasts). Hence, despite the broad remit (which at the time gave equal emphasis to 
fiscal policy and growth/employment issues)
19
                                                 
17 See Wyplosz (2002, 2005, 2008), Calmfors (2003a, 2005), Annett et al. (2005) and Debrun et al. (2009) 
for surveys of various proposals. 
, the major part of the Council’s work has 
focused on fiscal policy, although a substantial part of it has dealt with other issues. 
18 See Calmfors (2010) and Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011). 
19 See Section 5.5 below.             14 
     
 
Calmfors and Wren-Lewis, however,  also note that both media and politicians have 
showed more interest in the Council's analyses of employment/growth issues than in its 
analyses of fiscal policy. This might be seen as an indication that the broad remit diverts 
interest away from fiscal policy to other issues. But this interpretation is not self-evident. 
It could also be the case that fiscal issues receive more  public  interest than would 
otherwise be the case because the breadth of the reports increases interest in them in 
general. Moreover, given the strong public finances in Sweden it is not surprising that 
fiscal issues have not been at the forefront of the public debate. 
 
Evaluation of fiscal policy as a stabilisation tool 
The main reason for establishing an independent fiscal watchdog is to strengthen budget 
discipline and the role of long-term fiscal considerations. Against this background, how 
should one view the FPC’s remit to evaluate the fiscal stance in relation to the cyclical 
situation? It is a more ambitious task than just to monitor the compliance of fiscal policy 
with the surplus target and the expenditure ceiling. It is, however, in line with a number 
of academic proposals on fiscal councils, which have focused exactly on such a role, as it 
has been recognised that inappropriate fiscal responses to cyclical developments have 
often been an important cause of deficit bias.
20
  According to the quantitative evaluation by Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011), the 
major part of the fiscal policy discussions in the FPC’s reports have dealt with fiscal 
sustainability and the compliance of policy with the budget targets (60 per cent of the 
fiscal policy discussion) and only a smaller part with macroeconomic stabilisation.  
  
It might seem surprising that the Council advocated a more expansionary fiscal 
policy stance than the Government during the 2009-2010 downturn. For example, the 
Minister for Finance expressed dismay over having created a fiscal watchdog and then 
finding that this body was more fiscally activist than the Government itself.
21
                                                 
20 See, for example, Wren-Lewis (1996), Ball (1997), Seidman (2001), Wyplosz (2002, 2005, 2008) and 
Calmfors (2003a,b, 2005). 
 
21 Öppen utfrågning om Finanspolitiska rådets rapport (2009) . A similar view was expressed by one of the 
Finance Ministry’s state secretaries in a debate organised by the Swedish Economic Association (Hansson 
2009).              15 
     
 
  It is, of course,  to be  expected  that  a  fiscal  watchdog  for most of the time 
advocates  more fiscal restraint  than  the  Government, since the latter takes  part  in  a 
political process where short-term considerations may lead to deficit bias. But it does not 
follow that this must always be the case for a council that is to monitor stabilisation 
policy efforts as well.  Government policy often  tends  to build on very  conventional 
wisdom and to adapt late to changed circumstances. The Council judged this to be the 
case in Sweden when the  world financial crisis erupted in the autumn 2008. In the 
Council’s view, the Government was then so heavily influenced by the doctrine that 
active use of discretionary fiscal policy as a countercyclical tool should normally be 
avoided that it failed to realise that the extraordinary circumstances motivated another 
stand, especially against the background of the strong Swedish public finances. The FPC 
felt it had an obligation in this situation to point to both the need and the room for 
countercyclical fiscal policy.
22
  There is an important  analogy  to monetary policy. It is a common  view that 
independent central banking, by enhancing the credibility of low-inflation policy, has 
increased the scope for activist monetary policy in downturns. A similar argument could 
apply to an independent fiscal council. Since the Council is less likely to be suspected of 
having political motives for fiscal stimulus, which could lead to deficit bias, than the 
Government, it could be freer to make recommendations on such stimulus in a downturn 
and this way increase the scope for efficient stabilisation policy. 
 
  The FPC’s advocacy of a more expansionary fiscal stance in the recession could 
also be seen as an attempt to avoid procyclical  policy. Similar worries about 
procyclicality explain the Council’s warnings that fiscal policy in the subsequent upswing 
risked becoming too expansionary.  
 
Evaluation of the budget targets 
The FPC has put a large emphasis on analysing the appropriateness of the surplus target 
in addition to monitoring compliance with it. This is a contentious issue, since it means 
that the Council acts both as a policeman for the budget targets and as a judge of them. In 
                                                 
22 See Section 4 above.              16 
     
 
principle, the credibility of the Council, when policing the compliance with the budget 
targets, might be compromised if it is critical of the targets.  
The reason why the FPC has put so much focus on evaluation of the surplus target 
is that it is a key factor in the evaluation of fiscal sustainability, which is one of the most 
important parts of the remit.
23
This interpretation has been criticised by the Government, which has maintained 
that  ”the  Council is to monitor the compliance with the objectives decided by the 
Parliament and not the objectives themselves”.
 It seems a reasonable interpretation to view long-run fiscal 
sustainability as a higher-level constraint and the surplus target as an intermediate target 
to ensure that this constraint is met. It is impossible to evaluate fiscal sustainability 
without an analysis of whether the surplus target is compatible with it. 
24
 
 Since this stipulation is not logical and 
since it has not been written into the formal remit, the Council has chosen to ignore it. 
The Council as a debate watchdog 
A unique feature of the FPC’s remit is the task to monitor the motives, the research basis 
and the explanations for policy proposals given by the Government. This can be seen as a 
task of acting as a watchdog in the general economic policy debate.  
Why has the Council been given this task? A possible answer is a long Swedish 
tradition of academic economists participating with a high profile in the public debate. It 
goes back to economists with an international fame like Knut Wicksell (who was jailed 
for blasphemy), Gustaf Cassel (who published around 1 500 op-eds), Gunnar Myrdal 
(who was a Social Democratic Minister), Bertil Ohlin (who was leader of the Swedish 
Liberal Party) and Assar Lindbeck (who in the 1980’s was instrumental in stopping trade 
union plans on socialising private corporations). Today – with the greater specialisation 
of research that has occurred –  it is much more difficult  for economists  both  to do 
qualified research and to participate in the public discussion. The establishment of the 
FPC can be seen as an attempt to institutionalise a high degree of interaction between 
academic research and economic policy, by seeing to it that at least some academics keep 
themselves updated on policy and participate continuously in the policy debate.  
                                                 
23 See Section 3. 
24 Finansdepartementet (2011).             17 
     
 
 
5.2 Resources and tasks  
In an international comparison, the FPC’s resources are very small. The current annual 
budget is below 1 million €. During the FPC’s first four years of existence the budget was 
even smaller. It can pay only for a small secretariat (a head, two senior economists, a 
research assistant and an administrator) and the commissioning of 6-7 background reports 
from external researchers a year. As a consequence, the Council’s academic members 
have to make heavy contributions to the report. 
  The FPC’s limited resources constrain substantially the amount of analysis that 
can be undertaken. The Council cannot  develop and administer  own large 
macroeconomic models. Nor are the resources sufficient for making own forecasts, 
costing various government proposals or auditing the government accounts. These tasks 
are instead performed by other government institutions with much larger resources than 
the FPC.   
The National Institute for Economic Research publishes regular macroeconomic 
forecasts and administers a large macroeconomic model that can be used to analyse the 
effects of various policy proposals. The Office for Budget Management publishes several 
times per year central government budget forecasts on the basis of detailed assessments 
and is responsible for the Government’s annual financial statement. The National Debt 
Office also makes central government budget forecasts. The National Audit Office, an 
institution under the Parliament with its independence granted in the Constitution, has a 
broad mandate of monitoring all government activities. In addition to normal auditing, 
this institution carries out in-depth analyses in  various  areas. It also analyses the 
compliance of fiscal policy with the budget targets, although this is done with fewer 
resources and less research expertise than the FPC has. 
  The FPC has no formal right to request help from the other institutions mentioned. 
At times it has, however, used some of its resources to buy model work from them. This 
has in particular been done from the National Institute of Economic Research, which has 
provided model calculations of the employment effects and net costs of the earned 
income tax credit, analyses of government investment and the government capital stock,             18 
     
 
and evaluations of government net worth.
25
  Through the ways described, the Council’s resources have been “leveraged”. But 
the limited resources and the fact that analyses cannot be requested from other 
government  institutions do limit the Council’s output. As a consequence, instead of 
producing own detailed assessments and forecasts, the FPC  has  focused  on broader 
evaluations of the Government’s analyses and how they relate to established research. 
Although these evaluations do not necessarily require large resources they can be of high 
quality. For example, the Council has, sometimes with the help of external researchers, 
undertaken in-depth analyses of the size of automatic stabilisers and of the Government’s 
calculations of the cyclically adjusted fiscal balance, of aggregate demand effects of 
fiscal consolidations in Sweden, of the length of the business cycles in Sweden in order to 
conclude whether the surplus target which applies to the business cycle has been met, of 
the critical government debt level at which interest rates are likely to start rising steeply, 
and of the employment and wage effects of the earned income tax credit. 
 In other cases there has been more informal 
co-operation, when the Council has initiated work undertaken by the other institutions. 
One recent example is an analysis by the Office for Budget Management of the automatic 
changes of government expenditures resulting from various indexation rules. 
  There is some overlap between the activities of the Council and those of the other 
institutions mentioned. The National Institute for Economic Research makes judgements 
on the appropriate fiscal policy stance and on the effects of various tax and labour market 
reforms.
26
                                                 
25  The  FPC’s secretariat is physically located in the premises of the National Institute of Economic 
Research. The Council’s work is, however, performed independently from the Institute’s. The Institute has 
no prior knowledge of the contents of the Council’s reports.  
 The National Audit Office has, like the FPC, pinpointed ambiguities in the 
fiscal framework and has also analysed effects of particular policies. Such an overlap 
need not be a problem. On the contrary, it contributes to a pluralistic policy discussion.
  The bottom line is that the  Council  can  function  with  only  small resources 
because there are other larger agents doing related work. This does not mean that these 
agents  dominate the FPC  in the public discussion: the Council’s analyses and 
recommendations usually catch considerably more media attention. 
26 However, a problem with the Institute’s analyses of the fiscal policy stance is that it is not always clear 
whether they represent recommendations or forecasts.             19 
     
 
  Notwithstanding all this, the FPC’s small resources are a problem. The Council 
has only functioned because of the large input provided by the members. This work is 
performed as side activities in addition to full academic positions  for  most of the 
members, but widely exceeds what is reasonable for such side activities. The Council’s 
long-run sustainability would seem to require that academic members can be freed from 
part of their ordinary duties during their periods of office. This applies in particular to the 
Council’s Chair. The Chair’s heavy workload meant that it was very difficult to fill this 
position in 2011 when the previous Chair (the author of this chapter) resigned.  
 
5.3 The FPC in the general political debate 
The FPC’s remit to evaluate policies and the grounds for them comes close to assessing 
their appropriateness. Recommendations on appropriate policy cannot be made without 
also  making value judgements. The Council has been very careful only  to  evaluate 
policies in relation to the aims stated by the Government. For example, when analysing 
the effects of the labour market reforms, the evaluations have only focused on whether 
they are likely to achieve the objective of raising employment, but not on their overall 
desirability when weighing these effects against those on income distribution. 
Politicians frequently refer to the Council’s analyses and conclusions. Although 
references are often selective and sometimes give a misleading picture, it must be judged 
favourably that such research-based inputs enter the political debate at all. The use of the 
FPC’s analyses by all political parties is likely to raise the overall quality of the debate. 
An important role for the Council’s analyses is also that they are frequently used by 
journalists to confront simplistic argumentations by politicians. 
 
Is there a political bias? 
An important problem concerns the possibility of a built-in bias in the effects of the 
FPC’s evaluations on the political debate. The remit is to evaluate the Government’s 
policies. It is natural that the analyses focus mainly on the scope for improvement rather 
than on praising the already good. Therefore, the reports are likely always to contain 
substantial parts that are critical of some government policies and recommendations on 
what the Council regards as better policies. But the opposition’s  proposals are  not             20 
     
 
subjected to similar critical evaluations, as this is not part of the remit. This may create an 
impression that the Council is more critical of the Government’s policies than of the 
alternatives proposed by the opposition, even when the reverse is the case. This has to 
some extent happened, as  the  FPC  has  often  been portrayed as  the  opponent  of  the 
government. 
  If such a built-in bias is to be corrected in the short term, it would require a 
change in the remit such that also opposition proposals are evaluated. This would imply a 
large extension of the remit. In the long term, the bias problem will probably be less 
severe, as the public is likely to learn that the Council makes critical evaluations of the 
policies of all governments. 
  There is, however, one sense in which the opposition is likely always to benefit 
more than the Government from the Council’s existence. This is because the Government 
has access to more analytical resources than the opposition. 
  Notwithstanding the above discussion, it appears as the Council has acquired a 
reputation for impartiality. There have been no accusations of partisanship and indeed, as 
discussed in Section 5.5, in 2011 there was a cross-party agreement endorsing the future 
existence of the council. 
 
The members and the Council 
The Council as a whole usually takes a policy stand only in the annual reports, but not in 
between the reports. An important question is to what extent Council members should be 
free to express their opinions in the public debate in between the reports. The Council has 
taken the view that it would not be consistent with the task to “work to achieve an 
increased public discussion in society on economic policy” if Council membership would 
restrict participation in the general debate. Therefore the policy in this respect has been 
formulated as follows: 
 
“The  Council as a whole does not continuously take a stand on economic policy. But the Council’s 
members participate in the public debate with their own views. They may, but need not necessarily, be 
shared by other Council members”.
27
                                                 
27 This is stated on the council’s webpage: www.finanspolitiskaradet.se. 
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In practice, it could still be a problem that the views of individual members (especially 
those of the Chair) are interpreted as being the views of the whole Council. The publicly 
expressed views of members are, however, likely to be constrained by the knowledge that 
it may be embarrassing to air a strong view and then later have to accept a compromise in 
the Council or be voted down. On the other hand, a strong public commitment may, as in 
all negotiations, be a means to improve a person’s bargaining strength in the group.
28
  Council members have, however, abstained from public comments on the 
Government’s economic policy immediately (around two months) before the publication 
of the annual report in May. For this reason,  members have not commented on the 
Government’s Spring Fiscal Policy Bill, which is published in April. This behaviour has 
not been guided by any formal rules, but there has been an implicit understanding among 
members that the report’s impact is maximised if the thinking in it is presented at one 





5.4 The FPC’s independence 
A well-functioning Council requires independence from the political system in analogy 
with what is needed for central banks. A first issue concerns appointments. The members 
of the FPC are appointed by the Government. This represents a potential risk of political 
appointments. The risk is, however, balanced by the stipulation that appointments should 
be made after proposals from the Council itself  (according to  a blueprint from the 
Economic Council in Denmark). This creates a reputation cost for the Government of not 
following the proposals. The Council has tried to increase this cost by announcing its 
proposals publicly without prior consultation of the Government. So far, the Council’s 
proposals have always been followed. 
                                                 
28 An example is when the Council’s Chair (the author of this chapter) in the autumn of 2008 took the 
public stand that the likely depth of the evolving recession motivated stronger fiscal stimulus than the 
Government had proposed in a situation when the majority of members were skeptical. The Chair’s 
committing to this position may have helped swing the position of the Council’s majority till the 
publication of the annual report in May 2009, but it also involved risk taking, since the Chair’s situation 
would have become awkward if the Council in the end had not endorsed this view. 
29 According to the Council’s statutes, dissenting views on the reports must be made public. To the four 
reports published in 2008-2011 there have in all been only three reservations: one in 2009 and two in 2011. 
The reservation in 2009 concerned the fiscal stance. The two reservations in 2011 concerned relatively 
minor issues.             22 
     
 
  It is a potential problem that the FPC is an agency under the Government rather 
than under the Parliament. Having the Parliament as the principal (as is the case for the 
National Audit Office) would have further stressed the Council’s independence.  It is 
unfortunate  that the Council’s head  –  like the head of all government agencies –  is 
obliged to have a regular annual meeting with the state secretary formally responsible for 
the Council (in this case in the Ministry of Finance) where the Council’s performance (in 
evaluating the Ministry) is discussed, since this discussion forms the basis for budget 
appropriations.  The  whole construction implies a risk for  undue pressure  from the 
Government.   
During the FPC’s first four years the Chair was also formally the head of the 
agency, which meant that the Chair was in charge of the Council’s budget. This changed 
in 2011.  The  budget is  now  instead controlled by a  separate  head of the Council’s 
secretariat, appointed by the Government without any formal say by the Council. 
Formally, the Chair can no longer  decide the use of the Council’s budget. With 
reasonable persons this may still work, with the head of the secretariat informally taking 
instructions from the Council members, who are the ones responsible for the reports. But 
in principle it is an awkward construction that could prove unworkable with the wrong 
persons involved. The Government’s motivation for this strange construction is that it 
reduces the workload of the Chair and cuts it loose from the yearly discussions with the 
Ministry of Finance of how well the Council has performed its evaluation activities: these 
discussions will in the future be held with the head of the secretariat. 
  The most important guarantee for independent evaluations by the Council is 
probably the fact that the majority of members are academics, who are active mainly in 
another arena than that of the Council. There would be a high reputation cost in the 
academic arena for researchers who are seen to be acting in a political way in the Council 
rather than making research-based recommendations. 
  One should, however, be aware of the risk in a small country like Sweden that 
derives from the fact that – almost – everyone in a field such as economics knows each 
other. This is a strong argument for having also foreign members of the council, as has 
indeed been the case so far. 
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5.5 The Council’s legitimacy and long-run survival  
A criticism originally advanced against the Council was that it is “undemocratic” to have 
unelected experts evaluate elected representatives.
30
  The  FPC’s  experiences illustrate a fundamental time inconsistency problem 
relating to independent watchdogs.  On one hand, a government has an incentive to 
establish a watchdog as a way of signalling its determination to maintain fiscal discipline 
and possibly also, as in the Swedish case, to pursue research-based policies. On the other 
hand, once a watchdog is in place and criticises policy, there is a strong incentive for the 
Government to constrain its activities and perhaps also to effectively dismantle it. There 
are several such examples from other countries and there have been such ingredients in 
Sweden as well.
  According to the argument, this 
would give experts too much power relative to politicians. The obvious counterargument 
is that the FPC provides a basis for decisions that takes account of both preferences and 
constraints in a more rational way than would otherwise be the case. By providing better 
information for citizens, their possibilities of holding policy makers accountable are 
increased. 
31
  When the liberal-conservative Government established the FPC in 2007, it was 
presented as an important addition to the fiscal framework.
 
32
  The Minister for Finance’s hostility culminated in the late autumn of 2010 after 
the Council had sent an open letter to the Government, where it raised the worries about 
its situation that it had since its inception been discussing with the Government. The 
letter pointed to the large discrepancy between the Council’s resources and its remit, to 
  But  over time as the 
Council criticised parts of government policy – although on the whole making a positive 
evaluation of it – the Minister for Finance became increasingly critical about the Council 
in his public comments. A number of pejorative comments on both the Council’s work 
and its Chair, of a type that have been unusual in the Swedish economic-policy debate, 
were made.  
                                                 
30 The Social Democrats argued in this way when the FPC was established. The formulation used was that 
“ultimately it should be the elected representatives of the Swedish people who evaluate the policy 
pursued”. They went on to argue that “for this reason we reject the Government’s proposal to give a Fiscal 
Policy Council the task of evaluating the contents of policy” (Motion2 006/07:Fi10). 
31 See Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011). 
32 See, for example, Ministry of Finance (2009) and Finansdepartementet (2010).              24 
     
 
the unsustainability of a situation where most Council members perform their work as 
side activities to their ordinary academic positions (implying that the universities fund a 
major part of the FPC’s work) and advocated a change of principal from the Government 
to the Parliament to safeguard the Council’s independence. The FPC’s motivation for 
making these issues public was the view that the Ministry of Finance, because of 
dissatisfaction with the Council’s critical evaluations of certain policies, was unwilling to 
give  it  more reasonable working conditions (in fact reneging  on earlier promises to 
improve them) and wanted to “push the Council around” behind closed doors. The letter 
triggered a very negative reaction from the Minister for Finance, who threatened to cut 
down the FPC’s resources because of “its wild-grown activities”.
33
  The Minister’s reaction was widely criticised in the press. The Council also 
received support from both the IMF (2010, 2011) and the OECD (2011), which made 
very favourable judgements of the quality of the Council’s work and rather supported an 
increased role for it.   
 
In February 2011, the Minister for Finance suddenly changed his position and 
invited the opposition to talks on how the Council could be strengthened at the same time 
as he started to praise its work. In April 2011, an agreement was concluded between the 
Government, the Social Democrats, the Greens and the Left. Although the agreement 
does not change the Council’s status as an agency under the Government, it strengthens 
its position considerably as it is now endorsed also by the opposition parties that initially 
voted against its establishment. There is also now an implicit commitment that changes in 
the FPC’s remit, status and resources should be decided in cross-party agreements.  
The agreement implied somewhat larger resources for the Council. However, the 
sustainability problem arising from the fact that the bulk of the Council’s work is done by 
its members as side activities to their ordinary employment remains. In fact, this problem 
has been exacerbated as the Government has now closed all  possibilities to buy out 
members on part-time from their ordinary employment. Before, the Council could do this 
on a limited scale (it was done only for the Chair) to the extent that the budget permitted 
it. Now, the council has been explicitly forbidden to do so. It is difficult to interpret this 
in any other way than that the Government wants to put limits to how much work is put 
                                                 
33 Finanspolitiska rådet kräver mer (2010).             25 
     
 
down by Council  members and thus how ambitious the reports can be. In fact, the 
Council has behind the scenes been advised by the responsible state secretary in the 
Ministry of Finance to lower its ambitions. 
  The cross-party agreement also involved some changes in the  FPC’s  remit. 
According to the original statutes, evaluation of fiscal sustainability, monitoring that 
fiscal policy observed the budget targets, analysis of the fiscal stance in relation to the 
cyclical situation, monitoring of employment and growth developments, analysis of the 
transparency of policy, and evaluations of the government’s forecasts and forecast 
models were of equal importance. The revision specified evaluation of fiscal 
sustainability and monitoring of the compliance of policy with the budget targets as the 
primary activities, and the other ones as activities that are also to be performed or that 
may be performed.
34
   
 As discussed in Section 5.1, a case can be made for a narrower remit 
than the one the FPC  had  earlier. It is, however, disturbing that the revised remit 
downplays areas where the Council has been critical of government policy (such as the 
use of fiscal policy as a stabilisation instrument). Since analysis of the distribution of 
welfare was added as a task (on the initiative of the opposition parties), the idea does not 
seem to have been to narrow the remit in total. 
6 Concluding comments 
Two features stand out for the  Swedish Fiscal Policy Council: the  small  amount of 
resources and the breadth of the remit. 
  Resources are probably  too small for a sustainable activity  of high quality. 
However, the Swedish case also illustrates the importance of the environment in which a 
fiscal council operates. In Sweden, there are a number of other agencies with substantial 
independence from the Government performing some of the tasks that could also be done 
by the Council. These other institutions are responsible for both macroeconomic 
forecasting and more detailed budget evaluations. This has allowed the FPC to focus on 
more overall judgements with a heavier research input. 
  The Council has a very broad remit. It should not only focus on long-run fiscal 
sustainability but also judge fiscal policy from a cyclical point of view. This is in line 
                                                 
34 See Section 3,             26 
     
 
with some of the academic proposals on fiscal councils in the international discussion. 
But the remit to evaluate growth, employment and welfare distribution goes beyond most 
of the earlier discussion on fiscal councils, although watchdogs in some other countries 
also have such tasks. 
  The FPC’s broad remit might weaken its role as a fiscal watchdog. On the other 
hand, it is logical to analyse  both employment and growth together with fiscal 
sustainability, since the former are crucial determinants of the latter. Having a broad 
remit with many issues to analyse probably also reduces the risk that the analyses will be 
seen as partisan, as the probability of disagreement with all political parties increases. 
  A unique feature of the Swedish Council’s remit is monitoring of the motives, the 
research basis and the explanations for policy proposals given by the Government. This 
could be interpreted as the Council’s key task since it is basically a fundamental service 
to democratic decision-making to help provide a good input into the public economic 
policy debate. Such a role for economists has a long tradition in Sweden. 
  The Swedish Council  has in a relatively short time established  itself as an 
important participant in the economic-policy discussion and acquired a reputation for 
competent and independent analysis. At the same time, the Council’s experiences 
highlight the importance of providing sufficient funding from the start and formal 
guarantees for the independence of a fiscal watchdog. Underfunding and too close  a 
formal association with the Government has resulted in an unnecessarily high level of 
conflict with the Minister for Finance when the council has tried to assert principles for 
fiscal watchdogs emphasised in the international discussion.  
  Another lesson from the discussion here is that there can be no uniform model for 
fiscal councils. The pre-existing institutional set-up, traditions, historical experiences and 
policy problems differ among countries and make it natural to choose different 
institutional arrangements. To be successful, these need to take due account of the special 
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